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Introduction 
There are many things about the future we know for sure. It is, for in-
stance, certain that several million children will die of hunger next year, or that 
humans will not be able to live on earth once the sun has become a red giant in 
seven billion years. Other bits of our foreknowledge are, however, not of de-
terministic, but of probabilistic nature. Thus, it is very improbable that an as-
teroid hits the earth and extinguishes all forms of advanced life within the next 
decade—a probability forecast established from astronomical observations as 
well as geological evidence for similar impacts (Napier 2008). Still, like de-
terministic prediction, probabilistic foreknowledge faces limitations: There are 
statements about the future to which we cannot reliably assign probabilities. 
Section 1 is devoted to defending this thesis in some detail. Where even proba-
bilistic prediction fails, foreknowledge is (at most) possibilistic in kind; i.e. we 
know some future events to be possible, and some other events to be impos-
sible. This tripartite classification of foreknowledge is nothing but Frank 
Knight's classic distinction of different epistemic modes (Knight 1921). And I 
shall adopt Knight's terminology, "certainty—risk—uncertainty", in the follow-
ing. The classification raises, in particular, the methodological question how to 
obtain and justify possibilistic statements. What we need is what I suggest to 
call a "modal methodology". How does one rationally reason in the epistemic 
mode of uncertainty? I will argue in section 2 that this is anything but a trivial 
question—and that it actually gives rise to a methodological dilemma. Solving 
this dilemma is the main purpose of my paper. 
This paper's central theme can be approached from different angles, the 
previous paragraph being just one among others. I shall try to highlight some 
of these perspectives in this introductory section, spelling out how a modal 
methodology relates to other, well-studied philosophical issues. 
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So, an alternative way to see the urgency of clarifying how to establish 
possibility statements is by considering the debate about the precautionary 
principle. One argument against what Stephen Gardiner (Gardiner 2006) iden-
tifies as the core precautionary principle, basically Rawls' maximin rule, criti-
cises that this very principle gives "mere possibilities" too important a weight 
in policy consideration (Manson 2002). But responsible decision making, the 
so-called mere-possibility-argument says, surely shouldn't rely on pure fiction: 
Although we can imagine that hot chocolate causes brain cancer, this is by no 
means relevant for health and food policies, or is it? Gardiner, in defence of the 
precautionary principle, rightly notes that (i) the application of the precaution-
ary principle requires a range of "realistic possibilities" to be established, and 
that (ii) this is required by any principle for decision making under uncertainty 
whatsoever. In other words, he stresses the need for a modal methodology. 
The thoughts unfolded in this paper are closely related to another point: 
One might worry whether Knight's tripartite classification is really exhaustive. 
Two issues give rise to this general worry. First, Knight's classification seems 
to be very coarse. In particular, the gap between the epistemic modes of risk 
and uncertainty appears to be rather wide. This impression probably drives 
some scientists to make probabilistic forecasts by all means, hence, they might 
reason: "Well, I know for sure more about the system than mere possibilities. 
Maybe my understanding is not enough, strictly spoken, to establish reliable 
probability forecasts—but if that's the only alternative ... And surely, I'm sup-
posed to express all I know about the system." The question is, of course: Is 
there really no intermediate mode between probabilistic and possibilistic pre-
diction? Important conceptual work in epistemology and decision theory has 
been devoted to this question; and the theory of imprecise probabilities (e.g. 
Levi 1980; Walley 1991) can be considered as one intermediate epistemic 
mode, extending Knight's classification. Second, one might hold Knight's class-
ification to be limited with regard to its extreme: Is there really no other mode 
of reasoning in which we know less than in the mode of uncertainty? It has 
been suggested, notably by scholars in environmental sciences (e.g. Wynne 
1993; Faber, Manstetten et al. 1996; Healy 1999), to extend Knight's classifica-
tion by a fourth mode, namely ignorance. Accordingly, "uncertainty" refers, 
more precisely, to a situation where all possibilities (but no probabilities) are 
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known, whereas in the epistemic mode of ignorance one's knowledge of future 
possibilities is incomplete, i.e. some possibilities are ignored. This paper's pro-
posal as to how to solve the methodological dilemma presented in section 2 
takes into account these shortcomings of Knight's original classification. It 
amounts to modifying Knight's distinction and providing us a conceptual 
framework for expressing non-probabilistic, possibilistic knowledge in a more 
differentiated and nuanced way. Clearly, this more fine-grained conceptual 
framework raises the same methodological question as the Knightian one, i.e.: 
How do we come up with and justify the respective knowledge claims under 
uncertainty? This leads, as will be shown in section 4, to a plurality of modal 
methods. 
Yet another perspective from which the epistemological reflections of 
this paper can be motivated starts from an observation about scientific reason-
ing. In some scientific disciplines, especially those which try to understand and 
to predict complex systems, scientists work simultaneously with different and 
incompatible models of one and the same system without being able to rank 
these models according to significant epistemic criteria. They face model-
underdetermination. This triggers the question as to the status of their results. 
E.g., does model-underteremination compel one to conditionalise every predic-
tion relative to the specific model which was used to generate it? Or is there a 
way of interpreting these results in a more general and unconditionalised way? 
Can simulations based on different, conflicting models show that some state-
ment is possible, or even probable? The specific science I had in mind when 
developing these thoughts was climate science, where, clearly, model-
underdetermination reigns (Betz 2009a). The question of how we adequately 
express and characterise our knowledge about the climate's future becomes 
ever more pressing given the policy issues involved. However, my hypothesis 
is that model-underdetermination represents, at least in so far complex systems 
are the object of scientific inquiry, such as in earth sciences (Oreskes, Shrader-
Frechette et al. 1994), the rule rather than the exception. Thus I will illustrate 
my arguments with examples from two different disciplines: climate science, in 
particular the prediction of anthropogenic climate change (IPCC 1990, 1996, 
2001, 2007), on the one hand, and geology, specifically the study of carbon 
storage in geological reservoirs by computer simulations (IPCC 2005), on the 
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other hand. Like climate science, the latter represents a discipline, where con-
flicting models and simulations are used side by side (see Gaus, Audigane et al. 
2008). 
1. (There are) Boundaries of probabilistic foreknowledge 
Modern science can hardly be imagined without probability. From 
quantum mechanics, through statistical treatment of large ensembles of indi-
viduals—be it in statistical mechanics or in econometrics, to statistical tests of 
deterministic hypotheses: Probabilistic methods seem to be irreplaceable in 
today's scientist's methodological toolbox. And arguably, these methods are 
highly successful, allowing us in particular to better understand and assess the 
uncertainties we are facing, and thus to take more effective public or private 
decisions. Whenever probabilistic knowledge is available, it would be straight 
forward irresponsible not to make use of it. 
This undeniable and ubiquitous success of probabilistic methods might 
spur the hope that they are universally applicable. That is, whenever we are 
unable to establish reliable deterministic results, we will at least get proba-
bilistic statements. Likewise, (O'Hagan and Oakley 2004) write:  
In principle, probability is uniquely appropriate for the representation and 
quantification of all forms of uncertainty; it is in this sense that we claim that 
'probability is perfect'. (p. 239) 
[Lee Clarke -> probabilism, Larry Laudan] 
What explains, besides successful applications, that probabilistic meth-
ods are thought to be universally applicable? The rise of Bayesianism, which 
licenses the attribution of (subjective) probabilities to every statement whatso-
ever, might be one reason for the very belief that 'probability is universal'; a 
second one could lie in a growing awareness that knowledge is sometimes im-
plicit, and that expert judgement, including probability estimates, can be reli-
able without the expert being able to give an explicit justification of his judge-
ment—facts the philosophical and scientific community has become increas-
ingly aware of in the 2nd half of the twentieth century. 
This section's aim is simply to remind us that that is not so. There is no 
reason to believe that 'probability is universal', or "perfect", even not "in prin-
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ciple". We cannot justifiably or reliably assign probabilities to every sentence 
which is of importance to us. One case in point are climate predictions. Here, 
Bayesian methods have been applied to generate probabilistic climate forecasts 
(cf. Webster, Forest et al. 2003; Hegerl, Crowley et al. 2006). The ultimate 
reason why these fail in providing justified probabilistic climate predictions, 
which don't hold merely conditional to a certain model, is that the posterior 
probabilities still significantly depend on the (arbitrary) prior. And expert elici-
tation, which has also been applied in climatology to establish probability fore-
casts (e.g. Zickfeld, Levermann et al. 2007), leads us nowhere, either. Because, 
in spite of being experts for many things, climate scientists are definitely not 
well-trained and experienced experts for future, unprecedented anthropogenic 
climate change: 21st century climate change is a singular event. We have here a 
major dis-analogy to the well-trained medical doctor who has, during his ca-
reer, internalised a tremendous amount of information regarding similar cases 
on which he can implicitly found his informed judgment. Where similar cases, 
and thence a track record of relevant experiences, are lacking, there is abso-
lutely no reason—it would even be entirely naïve—to accept a merely implicit 
judgement of a so-called expert. Unfortunately, the fourth IPCC assessment 
report made use of probabilistic predictions (IPCC 2007). I think this was a 
mistake (Betz 2007). However, climate scientists are critically discussing the 
scope of probabilistic methods, assessing, with regard to their own domain, the 
limits of probabilistic knowledge. So do, for example, the organisers of the 
climateprediction.net–Project in two recent articles, whose positive proposal 
for how o interpret climate simulation results will be discussed in section 5 
(Stainforth, Allen et al. 2007; Stainforth, Downing et al. 2007). The authors are 
making a succinct and clear argument against probabilistic projections of an-
thropogenic climate change. They see, rightly, that this is required to safeguard 
the credibility of climate science, and its policy advice. As the case of climate 
prediction makes clear: Accepting the limits of probabilistic methods and re-
fusing to make probabilistic forecasts where those limits are exceeded, origi-
nates, ultimately, from the virtue of truthfulness, and from the requirements of 
scientific policy advice in a democratic society. 
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2. Justifying possibilistic statements: the dilemma 
Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many sys-
tems cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, 
Knight's third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the 
probabilistic mode. We cannot, at least not currently, establish reliable proba-
bilistic climate projections. But we can reasonably ask which future evolutions 
of the climate system are possible, and whether certain other climate projec-
tions—or "scenarios", as I shall also say in the following—are impossible. 
"Possibility", here, means neither logical nor metaphysical possibility, 
but simply consistency with our relevant background knowledge. So, if we ask: 
can global mean temperature possibly rise more than 7° if the CO2-
concentration doubles, we inquire as to the consistency of this statement with 
what we know about the climate (which may comprise deterministic, proba-
bilistic or other possibilistic statements). 
But how are we supposed to answer such a question? And how could 
we justify a given answer? [As a possibilistic prediction is, in some situations, 
all we can reliably establish, the methodological question how to justify scien-
tific possibility statements pops up the agenda.] Since I equate possibility with 
relative consistency, the modal methodology seems to be, at first glance, a 
simple application of deductive logic. That is, unfortunately, untrue. Logic 
does not fully determine a modal methodology for, say, climate change projec-
tions, because it is unclear whether the corresponding range of possibilities 
should contain (i) all future scenarios, which are positively shown to be rela-
tively consistent, or (ii) those, which have not been shown to be inconsistent 
with the relevant background knowledge. This distinction gives rise to two 
alternative modal methodologies: modal inductivism and modal 
falsificationism.  
According to modal inductivism, a (complex) statement is considered 
as scientifically possible if and only if it is positively shown to be possible. 
This means that those storylines which are not explicitly demonstrated to be 
possible won’t figure in the list of future possibilities.  
Modal falsificationism, in contrast, holds that a statement has to be con-
sidered as scientifically possible if and only if it is not positively shown to be 
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impossible. Accordingly, the construction of the scenario range proceeds in 
two steps. In a first step, one imagines as many different future storylines as 
possible; in a second step, these hypothetical scenarios are systematically 
tested for consistency with what we know. Only those storylines which survive 
these tests are included in the range of future possibilities.  
Modal inductivism has been the preferred methodology of the IPCC 
and was coherently implemented in its first three Assessment Reports (IPCC 
1990, 1996, 2001). A study of the future scenario ranges that are communi-
cated in the IPCC reports suggests that the IPCC simply identifies the range of 
possible climate scenarios with the range of simulation results, thus assuming 
that, first, every climate simulation shows the respective result to be consistent 
with our background knowledge, and, second, a scenario is scientifically pos-
sible in a policy-relevant way if and only if its consistency is verified. 
Modal inductivism and modal falsificationism give rise to a significant 
methodological dilemma. First of all, the two methods represent a real alterna-
tive and result, if implemented, in completely different possibility ranges. 
Ultimately, this will affect the policy decisions we take. Consider, for example, 
the melting of the West Antarctic ice-sheet. Such a scenario can neither be 
shown to be relatively consistent, because we lack the appropriate models of 
ice-dynamics, nor can we demonstrate that it is inconsistent (cf. IPCC 2007, 
Box 10.1, Section 10.7.4.4). So whether the melting of the West Antarctic ice-
sheet is considered as possible merely depends on whether modal inductivism 
or modal falsificationism is implemented. Still, that makes a difference of 7m 
in sea-level rise projections, and will therefore crucially influence climate miti-
gation and adaptation policies. 
So we have a real alternative. Now this represents a dilemma, because 
both methodologies seem to be problematic. Modal inductivism, on the one 
hand, systematically underestimates the range of possibilities. It’s a folly to 
consider a specific behaviour of some complex system as impossible just be-
cause we have not yet developed an appropriate (not necessarily perfect or 
unique) model that can reproduce the behaviour. Modal inductivism's system-
atic bias becomes also apparent in the IPCC reports, who typically had to admit 
that previous reports underestimated uncertainties; scenario ranges tended to be 
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too narrow and were, sometimes, corrected in the following report (Betz 
2009b). 
Modal falsificationism, on the other hand, does not really do much bet-
ter, it appears. This methodology licenses the inclusion of all sorts of state-
ments and storylines in the range of future possibilities and leads to a prolifer-
ation of possibilities—which is, by the way, precisely the reason for which the 
"mere-possibility-argument" criticised the precautionary principle. Modal falsi-
ficationism therefore avoids the typical error of modal inductivism, namely to 
overlook a possibility, but it is prone to another type of error: that is to consider 
a statement as possible which actually isn't. 
3. Dropping the dilemma's underlying assumption 
Some philosophers of science might regard the situation as depicted so 
far symptomatic, because it seems to show, once more, that methodological 
choices are ultimately based on value judgements—in this case, value judge-
ments regarding the avoidance of which type of error (false impossibility or 
false possibility) should be preferred. 
The following sections, however, run counter to such a view. They aim 
at avoiding the dilemma exposed above and will, if they succeed, eliminate this 
specific value-component in modal methodology. By doing so, they will draw 
a richer and more nuanced picture of our modal knowledge than one typically 
encounters, and we have encountered so far. 
There is an implicit assumption, hardly ever questioned, which under-
lies and generates the dilemma. Namely, 
(1) Possibilistic statements about the future fall into two classes: a class of 
possible, and a class of impossible statements. 
This basic assumption about the logical geography of statements about the fu-
ture implies that a modal methodology consists in rules which prescribe how to 
sort statements by assigning them to one of these two classes. 
My suggestion is that we should replace (1) by a more differentiated 
view. 
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(2) Possibilistic statements about the future fall into three classes: (i) veri-
fied possibilities, i.e. statements which are shown to be possible, (ii) 
verified impossibilities, i.e. statements which are shown to be impos-
sible, and (iii) possibilistic hypotheses, i.e. statements which are articu-
lated, but neither shown to be possible, nor shown to be impossible. 
I understand that this classification is mutually exclusive, though not necessa-
rily exhaustive. Moreover, it makes use of iterated modalities—but in a rather 
loose way, and I don't think that formalizing these issues gives significant new 
insights. When dealing with the methodology and dynamics of future possibili-
ties in the following sections, it will be convenient to visualise the classifica-
tion (2) as follows, 
 
The fact that the classificatory scheme (2) does not pretend to be exhaustive is 
reflected by the inclusion of an area "others" in the diagram. 
4. The variety of modal methods 
Modal methodology contains, generally, prescriptions for classifying 
statements about the future according to the types of possibilities and impossi-
bilities which are postulated. In line with the more fine-grained view expressed 
in (2), such a methodology consists in at least three different methods which 
state conditions for assigning a statement to one of the three postulated catego-
ries: the articulation of possibilistic hypotheses, the verification of possibilistic 
hypotheses, and the falsification of possibilistic hypotheses. 
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The articulation of a possibilistic hypothesis is the most fundamental 
method of a modal methodology. A possibility statement cannot be submitted 
to any further examination unless it is articulated. In other words, we have to 
think of a possibility in the very first place. This sounds trivial only to the inex-
perienced. Many future scenarios, which had initially not even been imagined, 
later turned out to be possible, if not even true. The paradigmatic case is, obvi-
ously, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) triggering the depletion of the atmospheric 
ozone layer—a possibility no one even dreamt of in the 1930s. The articulation 
of possibilistic hypotheses does not require formal mathematical reasoning, 
sound argumentation, precise measurement, or any other virtue typically asso-
ciated with scientific reasoning; rather, it appeals to the virtues of fantasy, and 
creativity. No doubt, here is a place where laymen can contribute to scientific 
progress as much as trained experts can. It is worth noting, though, that the 
articulation of possibilistic hypotheses does not require but the virtues of fan-
tasy, and creativity. And this relates to a fact Philip Kitcher recently stressed, 
and reminded us of (Kitcher 2001): We do not simply expect scientific results 
to be accurate or true, but we also expect them to be significant. Specifically, 
possibilistic hypotheses should be significant, too. Scenarios, it seems to me, 
can be insignificant in different ways. Consider, again, climate scenarios:  they 
might simply not address the policy question at all (sales of Beatles-songs 
might skyrocket in ten years); or they might be articulated on an inappropriate 
level of detail (one extreme: it's, globally and on average, possibly going to be 
more windy; the other extreme: weather forecasts for all cities and every day in 
the year 2100). Whether there are other ways in which a scenario can be insig-
nificant, and whether judging a possibilistic hypothesis significant involves 
certain types of arguments, or is simply based on Urteilskraft, seem to me open 
questions. They represent one issue to be addressed when further elaborating 
the method of articulation, which is part of a modal methodology. 
Once a possibilistic hypothesis has been articulated, it can be verified, 
or falsified. Its verification consists in the demonstration that it is consistent 
with the relevant background knowledge; the articulated possibilistic hypoth-
esis becomes a verified possibility. This might be achieved in different ways, 
e.g. by deducing the hypothesis from the background knowledge and other 
already verified possibilities, or by constructing a model (in the sense of formal 
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semantics) which makes the background knowledge as well as the respective 
possibilistic hypothesis true. Verifying the possibility that more than 50% of 
the CO2 stored in a geological reservoir escapes within the next century might, 
for instance, consist in deducing this scenario from (i) knowledge about the 
geological reservoir, (ii) knowledge about the way supercritical CO2 behaves, 
(iii) the proven possibility that the caprock contains faults which expand and 
widen under increased pressure. 
The demonstration that an articulated possibilistic hypothesis is incon-
sistent with our background knowledge amounts to its falsification. The possi-
bilistic hypothesis becomes a definite impossibility. To prove an inconsistency, 
it suffices to deduce a contradiction. And such a deduction might merely start 
from a single fact. That is the reason why falsification, as a modal method, 
potentially allows to make use of heterogeneous and diverse evidence by inte-
grating it into a methodological framework. It turns it into "evidence for use" 
(Cartwright 2006). Thus, to give a hypothetical example, a seemingly simple 
fact about a CO2-storage site, such as whether a certain mineral occurs in the 
formation, can be sufficient, at least in principle, to rule out an entire future 
storage scenario in so far its implications contradict that single fact. 
So by identifying an assumption which underlies the dilemma of possi-
bilistic forecasting, and by replacing it with an alternative view, we found that 
a modal methodology contains a variety of different methods. But what does 
this imply for the initial dilemma? It is not difficult to see that it vanishes. Spe-
cifically, it presented us a false alternative. Instead of being incompatible 
methods, modal inductivism as well as modal falsificationism have both a role 
to play in modal methodology, namely when it comes to verifying or falsifying 
possibilistic hypotheses. Instead of choosing to base our decisions either on the 
results obtained by modal inductivism or those obtained by modal falsification-
ism, we should appreciate that both results contain valuable information about 
the future and should therefore be part of a more nuanced picture of what 
might going to happen. 
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5. The role of simulation in modal methodology 
As opposed to the articulation of possibilistic hypotheses, both their 
verification and falsification rely on scientific observation and reasoning, in-
cluding accurate measurements, statistical calculations, inductive and deduc-
tive arguments, mathematical deductions, and so on. This section addresses the 
question whether and how modal methods can make use of a particular tool for 
scientific reasoning: computer simulations. More specifically, I focus on cases 
where uncertainty stems from, or at least corresponds to, model-
underdetermination, that is cases where there is no single, empirically and 
structurally adequate model of the simulated system, but a plurality of differ-
ent, incompatible, and typically complex models giving rise to a variety of dif-
ferent simulations. What is the function these simulations might serve within a 
modal methodology? 
As long as we suppose that each model is at least possible, if not true, 
simulations might serve to verify possibilistic hypotheses by deducing them 
from a set of collectively possible statements. Similarly, these simulations 
based on complex models might be considered as models (or possible worlds) 
in the sense of formal semantics—thence demonstrating the possibility, respec-
tively relative consistency, of statements about the future. 'True in a model 
simulation' implies 'definitely possible'. But this seems to require that the mod-
els are at least possible—arguably a rather weak requirement. Or so it seems. 
Actually, some complex climate models (GCMs) are violating fundamental 
principles of mass and energy conservation. In which sense can these models 
be considered possible? And do corresponding simulations really show that 
some statement is consistent with our background knowledge? Things look 
even worse when we recall that every climate model is empirically inadequate 
and contradicts some empirical facts about the climate system (Stainforth, 
Allen et al. 2007). Every GCM is known to be inconsistent with our back-
ground knowledge. How could these models be used to demonstrate consis-
tency with our background knowledge? I don't have a satisfying answer to this 
question. One might try to defend climate simulation's purposefulness by a 
pragmatic reasoning in line with Eric Winsberg (Winsberg 1999, 2006), that is 
by pinpointing that models of this kind, constructed in this or that way (e.g. by 
integrating unrealistic flux-adjustments), have a successful track record regard-
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ing the verification of possibilistic hypotheses. Still, as a matter of fact, there is 
no such track record. (And it is not quite obvious how such a track record of 
successful verifications of modal hypotheses might even look like.) 
The value of simulations vis-à-vis falsification of modal hypotheses is 
even more doubtful. If, in a classic deduction, one premiss is merely possible, 
the conclusion cannot hold necessarily. Likewise, building on premisses which 
are themselves only known to be consistent with some background knowledge, 
you cannot prove that some other statement is inconsistent with the respective 
background knowledge. Or, a consideration of one possible world won't allow 
you to infer anything about all possible worlds; although that is, besides, what 
Plantinga tried to do in his version of the ontological argument, namely via the 
concept of "maximal greatness" (Plantinga 1977, p. 108). These logical facts 
entail that simulations, when model-underdetermination reigns, cannot be used 
to falsify possibilistic hypotheses. The falsification of modal hypotheses, e.g. 
that climate sensitivity is larger than 10°C, cannot rely on complex climate 
models, the scenario range has to be constrained by other, "robust" methods. 
These conclusions as to the role of simulations in modal methodology 
resonate with a recent assessment of climate model projections mentioned 
above (Stainforth, Allen et al. 2007). Firmly rejecting attempts to infer proba-
bilistic predictions from GCM ensembles, the authors suggest that the range of 
simulated climate projections represents "possibilities for future real-world 
climate" (p. 2155), and gives us "a lower bound on the maximum range of un-
certainty" (p. 2156). Thus, I understand, these authors take climate simulations 
to show that some future scenarios are possible (positive role in modal verifica-
tion) without claiming that only these simulated scenarios are possible (reject-
ing modal inductivsm). Moreover, Stainforth et al. seem to conclude that future 
scenarios cannot be shown to be impossible by GCM simulations (no role in 
modal falsification): While GCM ensembles provide a lower bound to the 
range of possibilities, "objective and robust methods" are required  "to con-
strain them" (p. 2159). 
To sum up, simulations might have a role to play in modal verification; 
they definitely won't contribute to modal falsification. But what about the arti-
culation of modal hypotheses? I said that this method primarily relies on the 
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virtues of fantasy and creativity rather than on the classic epistemic virtues of 
scientific reasoning. But then, computer simulations seem to be irrelevant here. 
For they help us with complex computation, the integration and visualization 
of large amounts of very precise data, the design of huge experiments, etc.—in 
brief, they enhance scientific observation and reasoning (cf. Humphreys 2004). 
But they don't enhance fantasy. Or do they? Complex simulations have an in-
teresting epistemic feature, which makes them apt for supporting our imagina-
tion, our creativity. They can give rise to so-called emergent phenomena, 
where I shall follow Mark Bedau (Bedau 1997) in defining a "weakly emergent 
phenomenon" P of some system S which is governed by a microdynamic D as 
follows: 
Macrostate P of S with microdynamic D is weakly emergent iff P can be  
derived from D and S ’s external conditions but only by simulation. (378) 
Emergent phenomena which arise in complex systems whose micrody-
namics are known typically overstrain our imagination and capacity of fore-
sight—we cannot even imagine the kinds of self-organizing behaviour cellular 
automata exhibit from knowledge of their simplistic rules only. As a conse-
quence, simulating complex systems based on their microdynamics might sug-
gest possibilistic hypotheses we have not even thought about! A candidate for a 
case in point where simulations already have successfully enhanced our imagi-
nation is the possible shift of the intertropical convergence zone due to anthro-
pogenic climate change and a resulting drying of the Amazonian rain forest: a 
scenario which appears to have been suggested by simulations of the Hadley 
Center climate model in the 1990s (Cox, Betts et al. 2000; Cox, Betts et al. 
2004) and which was—but that is only a hypothesis and requires a more de-
tailed case study—possibly not even articulated beforehand. Given the difficul-
ties of applying simulations in order to verify modal hypotheses and the impos-
sibility to falsify them based on model simulation, I suggest that 'creative simu-
lation' which aims at articulating unseen possibilities—without pretending that 
they are really possible, or impossible—might be the ultimate and foremost 
function of computer simulations in the epistemic mode of uncertainty. It is 
clearly not the function they are supposed to fulfil today. And taking that task 
seriously would require rethinking the design strategies of simulations; epi-
stemic constraints on simulation building would be loosened; and progress 
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would consist not in convergence of simulation results but in a proliferation of 
the underlying models, and of the scenarios they generate.  
6. Surprises 
Surprises go hand in hand with a lack of knowledge, in particular fore-
knowledge. Were we gifted, or punished, with perfect foresight (Knight's epi-
stemic mode of certainty), nobody would ever be surprised. A modal method-
ology, a methodology for imperfect and uncertain knowledge acquisition, has 
to deal, somehow, with surprises. So how do surprises fit into the picture as 
unfolded so far? 
There are two types of surprises we can distinguish within the frame-
work of a modal methodology and it is important to keep both in mind when 
assessing our foreknowledge. A surprise of the first type occurs if a possibility 
that had not even been articulated becomes true. I briefly touched this issue 
above when stressing the importance of hypothesis articulation as a modal 
method. Hypothesis articulation is, essentially, the business of avoiding sur-
prises (of this first type). 
There is, however, a second type of surprise that does not simply extend 
the picture we've drawn so far, but rather shakes it. By defining possibility as 
relative consistency we assessed possibilistic hypotheses with regard to some 
body of background knowledge that was assumed to be stable. Still, this as-
sumption is, obviously, unrealistic. Our scientific knowledge is constantly 
changing, whereas that change is not cumulative: scientific progress also com-
prises refuting, correcting, and abandoning previous scientific beliefs. Now a 
readjustment of the background knowledge questions the entire former assess-
ment of possibilistic hypotheses. Statements, which were compatible with the 
old body of background knowledge, might not be so any more relative to the 
corrected one. Similarly, falsified possibilistic hypotheses might not be falsifi-
able anymore—or even turn out to be definitely consistent with the new back-
ground knowledge. Scientific progress shakes the entire assessment of modal 
hypotheses and requires their re-evaluation. So, scientific change, being in it-
self unpredictable (to some extent for a priori reasons, as Popper (1982) ar-
gued), has the potential to generate surprises vis-à-vis our modal knowledge. 
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As fallibilists, we must accept the meta-possibility that what we consider as 
definitely impossible today, might turn out to be possible some when in the 
future. 
Summing up the previous sections, the following diagram illustrates the 
potentially complex dynamics of our possibilistic knowledge with an abstract, 
hypothetical example. 
 
The figure shows the changing epistemic status of some statement P. In 
step 1, P was articulated for the first time; what was before an unseen possi-
bility or impossibility then became at least an articulated possibilistic hypoth-
esis. But, for whatever reason, P was not passed on to next generations and 
was, soon after its initial articulation, completely forgotten (step 2). Centuries 
later, P was articulated again (step 3), and quickly dismissed, given the back-
ground knowledge of that time, as impossible (step 4). The possibilistic hy-
pothesis P was falsified. Yet, scientific theories changed and in the course of 
the following decades, it became less and less clear that P really contradicted 
scientific knowledge (step 5). Due to scientific progress, the falsified possi-
bility P became, again, merely an articulated possibilistic hypothesis. And it 
took, eventually, modern computer simulations to demonstrate that P is defi-
nitely consistent with state of the art scientific knowledge (step 6). 
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7.  A new challenge for rational decision making 
The previous sections developed a conceptual framework and sketched 
some methods which allowed us to express our uncertain, non-probabilistic 
foreknowledge in a nuanced and differentiated way. Since responsible decision 
making should surely be based on all available evidence, scientific policy ad-
vice should incorporate a full description of our modal knowledge along the 
lines of this paper, including the identification of verified, falsified, and merely 
articulated hypotheses. This gives rise to further problems, as I will try to show 
in this section.  
These problems arise, mainly, because traditional principles for deci-
sion making under uncertainty, such as the maximin or the minimax regret 
principles (cf. Luce and Raiffa 1957; Savage 1972), assume that possibilistic 
predictions consist in simple possibility statements. They prescribe which al-
ternative action to choose given their various possible outcomes, without dis-
tinguishing different kinds of possibilities. As a consequence, these traditional 
decision principles are not applicable to the decision situations under uncer-
tainty when described along the lines of this paper. Adapting or replacing tradi-
tional principles so that they make use of all the information conveyed in the 
more detailed description of uncertainties generates non-trivial difficulties. I 
will try to highlight these with a hypothetical decision situation and an applica-
tion of the precautionary/maximin principle. 
Consider a decision situation where an agent faces to alternative op-
tions, A and B. Depending on the 'state of the world', these options' conse-
quences are valued very differently, as depicted in the following table. Some 
states of the world are shown to be possible (S1,S2,S3), others are neither shown 
to be possible, nor shown to be impossible (T1,T2,T3), and some are, finally, 
definitely impossible (U1,U2,U3). Let us try to apply the maximin rule to this 
situation. 
 Utility of consequences according to states of the world 
 Verified possibilities Unverified & unfalsified 
possibilities 
Falsified possibilities 
 S1 S2 S3 T1 T2 T3 U1 U2 U3 
A -100 10 5 -10 0 15 10 -100 50 
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B 20 0 -10 -200 -10 5 -2000 10 0 
First, we consider but the verified possibilities. The worst case of op-
tion A is much worse than the worst case of action B, since we have A(S1) = -
100 < -10 = B(S3). So B maximises the minimal outcome and should be ad-
opted. 
If we consider, second, the unverified & unfalsified possibilities, things 
turn upside down, though. The worst case of B with regard of these is T1, 
which is also A's worst case. However, B(T1) is much worse than A(T1) and, 
moreover, definitely worse than A(S1), i.e. A's worst case of all verified possi-
bilities. So no matter whether you consider but the unverified & unfalsified 
possibilities or the verified as well as the unverified & unfalsified possibilities: 
the maximin rule prescribes to opt for A, not for B. 
To illustrate another consideration that might become relevant, we con-
sider, third, the falsified hypotheses. If the state of the world U1—against all 
we know—became true, option B would trigger a catastrophe an order of mag-
nitude worse than the worst cases considered before. Sure, U1 has been shown 
to be impossible. Yet, the remarks of the last section reminded us that this 
judgement is fallible, and future scientific progress might trigger the surprising 
insight that U1 is far from being definitely impossible. Thus, it seems, based on 
the full, detailed picture, a very cautious person could legitimately opt for A on 
these very grounds. Or couldn't she? 
The decision deliberation starts to become messy and complicated. It is 
not clear to me, whether there are general principles which can guide rational 
decisions in such situations at all. This, however, must not serve as an excuse 
for simplifying the epistemic situation we face. If a policy decision requires a 
complex normative judgement, then democratically legitimised policy makers 
have arguably a hard job; it is, nevertheless, their job to balance and weigh the 
diverse risks of the alternative options. That is not the job of scientific policy 
advisers who might be tempted to simplify the situation, thereby predetermin-
ing the complex value judgements. 
Yet, in terms of complexity of the decision process, it is even getting 
worse if we consider, finally, the first type of surprises I identified in section 6. 
Options might trigger consequences we had not even articulated when deliber-
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ating our decision. It appears to me that an informed decision would not only 
require the communication of all verified, falsified and articulated possibilistic 
hypotheses. It should, ideally, take into account an estimate of the potential to 
generate surprises for each of the respective options. On the one hand, this is 
obviously a weird idea, almost self-refuting and bordering on the paradoxical: 
We should assess, compare, and count statements we have not even articu-
lated? Admittedly, I can't think of any detailed prescription for how to do that. 
On the other hand, this idea stresses an important point, as I'll try to make clear 
with the following example. Reconsider the options A and B from above. I 
made plausible that, in the light of U1, a very cautious person might reasonably 
prefer A over B. But assume that A actually involves constructing and running 
a machine that has never been built before. Assume that machine will acceler-
ate particles to speeds that have never been reached before in this part of the 
universe. Our best theories don't tell us anything about the kind situation that 
will be generated. Option B, we shall assume, just involves conventional 
means. Is it really irrational to refute option A on the grounds that we would be 
entering territory where we don't even know what might happen, where we 
have not the slightest experience of what sort of phenomena we might trigger, 
and where, therefore, we might eventually face consequences which exceed, 
today, our conceptual and imaginative capacity? Although such a conclusion is 
not compulsory, it does not seem wholly unreasonable, either. This example 
puts another, this paper's final, item on the agenda of a modal methodology: It 
is important to clarify when, and how, one should estimate an option's potential 
for surprise. 
Conclusion 
This paper sketched a conceptual framework for expressing uncertain, 
possibilistic knowledge. A framework which allows to express our foreknow-
ledge in a more nuanced way than simply by labelling some statements about 
the future as possible. I suggested that we should adopt this framework for stat-
ing and communicating scientific results in the epistemic mode of uncertainty. 
This avoids the methodological dilemma between modal inductivism and mo-
dal falsificationism. The framework's conceptual variety of possibilities trig-
gers a methodological variety, a plurality of modal methods. Some of these 
 20 
rely on traditional virtues of scientific reasoning, others don't. In some disci-
plines, computer simulations might, surprisingly, be most profitably applied in 
and contribute to the creative methods, rather than the strict and formal ones. 
This paper also generates a couple of questions which deserve further 
investigation. They include: 
• What counts as a significant hypothesis? If articulated possibilistic hy-
potheses are supposed to be relevant (e.g. to the decision problem), 
what kind of relevance or significance is referred to?  
• Can simulations really be creative? Can they contribute to reducing our 
ignorance by articulating possibilities we had not even thought about? 
Are there paradigmatic examples? And how would taking this function 
serious affect the design of simulation studies? 
• Can we estimate (the two different) potentials of surprise we face in a 
given epistemic situation? 
• Can traditional decision principles be adapted so that they take into ac-
count the detailed possibilistic information conveyed in the conceptual 
framework exposed in this paper? Or is the deliberation of decisions 
under uncertainty becoming too complicated to be guided by rules of 
rational choice? And, if not by normative principles, how else could a 
theory of rational choice support decision making under uncertainty? 
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